This paper analyses the effects of U.S. monetary policy on stock markets. We present evidence that individual stocks react in a highly heterogeneous fashion to U.S. monetary policy shocks and relate this heterogeneity to financial constraints and Tobin's q. First, we show that there are strong industry-specific effects of U.S. monetary policy. Second, we also find that for the 500 individual stocks comprising the S&P500 the firms with low cash flows, small size, poor credit ratings, low debt to capital ratios, high price-earnings ratios, or a high Tobin's q are affected significantly more by monetary policy.
The second part of Tobin's argument, namely the relationship between monetary policy and equity prices, is still not very well understood. On the one hand, it has proven difficult to properly identify monetary policy, since monetary policy may be endogenous in that central banks might react to developments in stock markets. Considerable progress has recently been made in this respect. Sack (2002, 2003) develop a methodology that exploits the heteroskedasticity present in financial markets to identify monetary policy shocks, while Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) derive monetary policy shocks through measures of market expectations obtained from federal funds futures contracts. In this paper, we will employ a methodology similar to Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) , by identifying monetary policy shocks through market expectations obtained from surveys of market participants.
On the other hand, more research is needed to understand why individual stocks react so differently to monetary policy shocks and what the driving force is behind this reaction. The recent paper by Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) shows that very little of the market's reaction can be attributed to the effect of monetary policy on the real rate of interest. Rather, the response of stock prices is driven by the impact on expected future excess returns and to some extent on expected future dividends. In this paper, we go a step further by analyzing which factors of these expectations are important for understanding the large heterogeneity in the reaction of individual stocks to monetary policy.
In the literature on the credit channel of monetary policy transmission, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) show that a tightening of monetary policy has a particularly strong impact on firms that are highly bankdependent borrowers as banks reduce their overall supply of credit. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) argue that worsening credit market conditions affect firms also by weakening their balance sheets as the present value of collateral falls with rising interest rates, and that this effect can be stronger for some firms than for others. Both arguments are based on information asymmetries: firms for which less information is publicly available may find it more difficult to access bank loans when credit conditions become tighter as banks tend to reduce credit lines first to those customers about whom they have the least information Hubbard, 1988, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994) . For instance, Thorbecke (1997) and Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) show that the response of stock returns to monetary policy is larger for small firms.
If a credit channel is at work for firms that are quoted on stock markets, one would expect that their stock prices respond to monetary policy in a heterogeneous fashion, with the prices of firms that are subject to relatively larger informational asymmetries reacting more strongly. The reason is that their expected future earnings are affected more, since these firms will find it harder to access funds following a monetary tightening, which should lead to a constraint of the supply of their goods.
Another differentiation of the response of stock prices to monetary policy is likely to be related to the response of the demand for firms' products. Firms that produce goods for which demand is highly cyclical or interest-sensitive should see their expected future earnings affected relatively more following a monetary policy move. These effects are not based on the credit channel; rather, they arise through the interestrate channel. Therefore, one would expect that the differentiation of responses to monetary policy is not only dependent on the firm-specific characteristics, but also on those of the industry to which the firm is affiliated. This paper analyses both effects, and aims to distinguish their respective contributions to the overall stock market response. In a first step, we present evidence that the individual firms included in the S&P500 index react in a highly heterogeneous fashion to U.S. monetary policy shocks. Second, we investigate whether we can identify industry-specific effects of monetary policy. It is found that cyclical sectors, such as technology, communications, and cyclical consumer goods, react two to three times stronger to monetary policy than less cyclical sectors.
As a third step, we test whether monetary policy has a stronger effect on the equity returns of firms that are financially constrained and/or have good investment opportunities. We find strong empirical support for this hypothesis using various proxies for financial constraints, with large differences in the effects of monetary policy across firms. We show that firms with low cash flows, poor credit ratings, low debt to capital ratios, high price-earnings ratios, or a high Tobin's q are affected significantly more by U.S. monetary policy. For instance, monetary policy affects firms with poor cash flows or low debt almost twice as much as firms with high cash flows or high debt.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the data employed in this study and discusses some conceptual issues important for the empirical analysis. Section 2 tests the role of the interest rate channel, credit channel, and Tobin's q in the response of equity markets to U.S. monetary policy. Section 3 concludes.
MONETARY POLICY AND EQUITY MARKETS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND DATA
An important issue that arises when measuring the effect of monetary policy on equity markets is the correct identification of monetary policy. Many papers in this literature (e.g., Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo, 2001, Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000) use changes in market interest rates or official rates as their measures of monetary policy. The problem with these measures, however, is that changes in interest rates can coincide with changes in business cycle conditions and other relevant economic variables. It is therefore not clear whether the effect attributed to monetary policy in those papers reflects other factors. A number of studies have therefore followed the example of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994) and extract monetary policy shocks as the orthogonalised innovations from VAR models. Thorbecke (1997) employs this methodology and finds that for the period 1953-90 the response of U.S. stock returns to monetary policy shocks, based on federal fund rates, differs significantly across industries and that small firms' returns react much more strongly than those of large firms. Patelis (1997) also employs a related methodology and arrives at very similar results, but also shows that the overall explanatory power of monetary policy for stock returns is rather low. Conover, Jensen, and Johnson (1999) look at 16 industrialized countries and find that equity markets in several of these markets react both to the local as well as to the U.S. "monetary environment," i.e., to changes in monetary policy.
A central shortcoming of this methodology is, however, that it is subject to an endogeneity bias, i.e. monetary policy shocks that are extracted from structural VAR models or from changes in interest rates using monthly or quarterly frequencies are unlikely to be purely exogenous. Sack (2002, 2003) have shown convincingly that monetary policy reacts to stock market developments in a way that consistently takes the impact of stock market movements on aggregate demand into account. The essence of Rigobon and Sack's argument is that causality between interest rates and equity prices runs in both directions. They show that not accounting for this endogeneity may introduce a significant bias in empirical estimations of the reaction of equity returns to monetary policy.
To identify monetary policy shocks more accurately, several papers have conducted event studies based on higher frequency observations, mostly daily data, analyzing how equity markets react to monetary policy. A seminal paper employing such an event-study methodology is that of Cook and Hahn (1989) , who test whether changes to the federal funds rate affected asset prices during the period 1974-79. Thorbecke (1997) uses the same methodology but extends the data also to the early Greenspan period 1987-94 and finds that the U.S. equity index indeed reacted significantly to changes in the federal funds rate on days when such changes took place.
Other event studies looking at the link between monetary policy and equity returns are those of Bomfim (2001) , Durham (2002) , Jensen and Johnson (1995) , and Lobo (2000) . For instance, Lobo (2000) finds for the period 1990-98 that tightenings in the federal funds and/or discount rate had a stronger effect on equity markets than monetary policy easings. Bomfim (2001) shows that volatility of equity markets tends to be relatively lower on days before and higher on days after monetary policy decisions.
One shortcoming of the existing event-study literature about monetary policy and equity markets is that monetary policy changes are simply measured as changes of policy rates on days of FOMC meetings. Kuttner (2001) has shown that on the day of announcements, markets react mostly not to the announcements per se, but to their unexpected component that is not already priced into the market. This argument is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis that asset prices should reflect all information available at any point in time.
The empirical methodology we use in this paper falls into the category of event studies. For the period from February 1994 to February 2003-i.e. since the Fed discloses decisions concerning the Fed funds rate target-we analyze the effect of the surprise component of monetary policy decisions on equity returns on the days of their announcement. This surprise is measured as the difference between the announcement of the FOMC decision and the market expectation. The expectations data for monetary policy decisions originate from a Reuters poll among market participants, conducted on Fridays before each FOMC meeting. We use the mean of the survey as our expectations measure although using the median yields similar econometric results.
Employing standard techniques in the literature (e.g., Gravelle and Moessner 2001), we test for unbiasedness and efficiency of the survey data. Tables A1 and  A2 show the results for the respective tests for the forecasts of monetary policy announcements. We find that the survey expectations are of good quality as they prove to be unbiased and efficient. As shown previously Fratzscher 2002, 2003) and also tested here in this paper, the survey-based measures perform very similar to expectations data based on federal funds futures, as employed by Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) .
For our measure of stock market returns, we use the returns of the S&P500 index, and of the 500 individual stocks therein as in early 2003, with Bloomberg as the source. This allows us to cover a broad spectrum of industries and firms, and thus to get at the issue of industry-and firm-specific effects of monetary policy. We calculate the daily returns as the log-difference of the daily closing quotes.
Obviously, there are various issues in the measurement of both the monetary policy surprises and the daily stock returns that merit discussing. Since the Reuters surveys are conducted on Fridays prior to the FOMC meetings, they cannot capture any change in market expectations that occurs in between. However, we are comforted by the fact that results are robust to the use of market expectations derived from the Fed funds futures market, where this issue does not arise.
Regarding the measure of stock returns, the choice of a daily frequency aims at striking a balance between identifiability of exogenous monetary policy surprises and estimation of sustained stock market effects. At lower frequencies, as we have argued above, it is difficult to disentangle the response of monetary policy to stock markets and thus to identify monetary policy surprises. Higher frequency data, as used, e.g. by Andersen et al. (2003) for exchange rates, on the other hand, might capture overshooting effects that quickly disappear. We therefore assume that effects found on a daily basis are likely to reveal the longer-run impact in a more reliable fashion.
Our sample covers 79 meetings of the FOMC, from February 4, 1994 to January 29, 2003. The beginning of the sample coincides with a change in FOMC practices: since 1994, the FOMC announces the Fed fund target rate in openness, whereas before, the market needed to infer the target rate from the Fed's behavior. We delete the unscheduled meeting of September 17, 2001 , where the FOMC decided to cut interest rates by 50 basis points in response to the events of September 11, for the unusual circumstances of this interest rate decision. Not all stocks are observed for the full sample period; on average, we observe stocks for 71 of the FOMC meeting days.
INDUSTRY EFFECTS, THE CREDIT CHANNEL AND TOBIN'S q
We now turn to the question of which firms are affected particularly strongly by monetary policy. Our sample of firms comprises the 500 individual stocks that currently constitute the S&P500. As a starting point, we test whether and how the S&P500 index responds to surprises. The econometric model used is formulated as follows:
where r t denotes the stock market return on day t and s t the monetary policy surprise.
1
We find that a surprise monetary tightening of 100 basis points lowers stock market returns by 5.5%, significant at the 1%-level. This is in line with the findings of Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) , who find a 5.3% effect, and Rigobon and Sack (2002) , who estimate a 6.2% effect, using similar indices and time periods.
As the next step, we use the empirical model of Equation (1) and regress each firm's return series individually on our monetary policy surprises. We find a glaring and large heterogeneity in the response across the 500 stocks in the S&P500 index. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the estimated parameters. They range from Ϫ0.44 to ϩ0.15, with a mean of Ϫ0.06 and a median of Ϫ0.05. The distribution is strongly skewed towards the left. Overall, these results show that the stock market response to monetary policy is highly asymmetric. Understanding and explaining this asymmetry and heterogeneity is the focus of the remainder of the paper.
As to the empirical methodology, to carry out the analysis in a panel framework of 500 stocks, we will turn to panel regressions of the form
where x i,t denotes some firm-specific characteristic, which can be either time-varying (e.g., its size or its cash flow to income ratio), or fixed over time (e.g., its industry 1. As expected, lagged values of the stock market return proved to be insignificant, and were therefore not included. The estimated parameter for the intercept is generally insignificant. The estimates are performed for the sample of FOMC meeting days only. affiliation). If this variable varies with the stock price (e.g., the price-earnings ratio), we enter it with one lag to avoid problems with endogeneity of the regressors.
Contrary to most of the literature on stock market effects, we decided not to run estimates on a stock by stock basis, and then explain the coefficients in a crosssectional regression, although the time-series dimension of our sample would have allowed us to do so. Rather, we decided to pool the data for two reasons. First, many of our firm-specific characteristics are time-varying. In a cross-sectional regression, we could not account for changes in these characteristics over time. Second, pooling allows us to take into account a potential cross-sectional correlation of residuals, which we consider a realistic assumption for stock market data: a high residual in one stock is likely to be accompanied by high residuals in other stocks. To account for this dependence across observations, we estimate Equation (2) via OLS using panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). This estimator corrects for heteroskedasticity and assumes that residuals are contemporaneously correlated across panels, and estimates the covariance of the OLS coefficients as
where Ω is the covariance matrix of the residuals:
where I is an identity matrix and Σ the m by m panel-by-panel covariance matrix of the residuals, formulated as
where ε i and ε j are the residuals for panels i and j from Equation (2) and T ij is the number of residuals between the panels that can be matched by time period. This variance estimator corrects for the dependence across observations. Neglecting such correlation will lead to decreased estimates of the variance and to a serious overestimation of the significance of parameters. As a matter of fact, this effect turns out to be important.
The results are extremely robust to other changes in the model specification, no matter whether we allow for fixed effects or not, or run the model over all trading days and use feasible GLS to allow for the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels. We experimented using a lag of stock returns; however, it never turned out significant, confirming the validity of the efficient market hypothesis in this context. Similarly, using further lags of the monetary policy surprise does not add any explanatory value-the effects are priced into the market within one day.
We checked for robustness with respect to pure time effects by calculating the mean of all stock returns on a daily basis, and by subtracting this daily mean from each stock, again day-by-day. This does control for pure time effects in the same way a full set of time dummies would do. All results are robust to this treatment.
Finally, we conducted several other robustness checks. Most importantly, excluding large outliers of monetary policy surprises yields qualitatively similar results for the estimates. Moreover, we repeated the analysis using monetary policy surprises as calculated by Kuttner (2001) and used in Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) , which are derived from federal funds futures markets, i.e. are market-based rather than survey-based as the measure used in this paper. All results are qualitatively, and generally quantitatively extremely robust. 
Industry-Specific Effects
The effect of monetary policy on stock market returns is likely to differ across industries for various reasons. The interest-sensitivity of the demand for products differs. Furthermore, if monetary policy affects exchange rates, tradable goods industries are likely to be affected more strongly. Finally, changes in the cost of capital induced by monetary policy are more important for capital-intensive industries. All these factors imply that expected future earnings are affected in a heterogeneous fashion across industries, which should be reflected in the responsiveness of stock returns. We would therefore expect firms in cyclical industries, capital-intensive industries, and industries that are relatively open to trade to be affected more strongly.
There is only relatively little evidence of the cross-sectional dimension of monetary policy effects in the literature to date. Exceptions are Dedola and Lippi (2000) and Peersman and Smets (2002) , who analyze the effect of identified VAR shocks on sectoral production indices for five OECD countries and seven countries of the euro area, respectively. Ganley and Salmon (1997) and Hayo and Uhlenbruck (2000) similarly analyze industry effects in the UK and Germany. In a similar fashion to the tests employed in this paper, Angeloni and Ehrmann (2003) analyze crosssectional responses of stock market returns to monetary policy in the euro area. For the U.S., to our knowledge only Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) perform a similar analysis. Overall, the findings of this literature support the hypotheses expressed above. Tables 1 and 2 report results for a breakdown of nine sectors and 60 industry groups, sorted by the magnitude of monetary policy effects. The left-hand columns report results of the panel version of Equation (1), where we repeatedly run regressions with stocks of one sector only. In order to get an assessment of the differences across sectors, we also report results from Model (2), where all stocks enter, regardless of their industry affiliation. We run this model repeatedly, each time redefining the industry dummy x i to capture stocks with different industry affiliations.
3 The second panels of Tables 1 and 2 report the corresponding results for β 2 . In that sense, the set of results shown in the second panels controls for market movements, and aims to estimate how sensitive stock returns of a given industry are to monetary policy relative to the market return. In other words, we 2. The tables with these results are available in the Working Paper version, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) .
3. Since there is no cross-sectional variation in S t , estimating Model (1) including individual stocks should yield identical results as estimating these models using returns of unweighted industry indices. We are grateful to the referee for making us aware of this point. Indeed, estimating the models using such industry indices produces identical point estimates and standard errors. are interested in understanding whether sector affiliation can help to explain what is commonly known as "β" in the capital asset pricing model, the covariability of a stock with the returns of the index on the occasion of a monetary policy surprise. Stock returns of firms in the technology, communication and cyclical consumer goods industries are more responsive than the average stock, whereas non-cyclical consumer goods, energy, and utilities are industries that respond below average, where the differences are always estimated at a 1% significance level. Industries whose reaction to monetary policy shocks is around the average are the basic materials, industrial, and financial sectors. Overall, this supports the hypothesis that cyclical and capital-intensive industries are affected most. Looking at the finer disaggregation presented in Table 2 , this impression gains further support. Highly non-cyclical sectors like food, agriculture, or beverages respond less, whereas firms in semiconductors, internet, telecommunications, computers, and software, to name a few, react more strongly than the average. As in Figure 1 , the effects vary considerably also in magnitude: whereas stock returns in the semiconductor industry drop by more than 20%; there are even industries that show a positive response, such as the beverages sector.
Firm-Specific Effects
The literature on the credit channel of monetary policy implies that the effect of monetary policy on firms tends to be asymmetric. In particular, firms that are financially constrained are likely to be affected more strongly by changes in interest rates than firms that are less constrained. Consistent with and building on Fama and French's (1995) evidence that small firms' equity returns are distinct from those of larger firms, Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) use the size of firms as a proxy for credit constraints. Analyzing monthly equity returns of size-sorted equity portfolios during the period 1954-97, they indeed find that smaller firms' returns are much more affected by monetary policy tightening and during recessions than those of larger firms. Using the size of firms as a proxy for the degree of credit constraints has been widespread. For instance, Gertler and Hubbard (1988) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that small firms are more dependent on bank loans. Nevertheless, a number of papers point out that size is only an imperfect proxy for the degree of credit constraints and attempt to find other, more direct measures. Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) , building on work by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , use a qualitative measure for financial constraints from information in firms' annual reports in fulfillment of SEC requirements and regulations. 4 Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) find for the period 1968-97 that financially constrained firms exhibit a significant degree of co-movements in terms of stock returns, and that this common factor cannot be attributed to the size of firms or other characteristics such as industry-specific effects. The important finding of their paper for our purpose is that they do not detect evidence that financially constrained firms react more strongly to changes in monetary policy or to business cycle conditions than less constrained ones.
To analyze the role of the credit channel, we borrow from the literature ideas of several proxies for the degree of financial constraints of firms. Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , we define the term "financial constraint" to imply a wedge between internal and external financing of a firm's investment. Firms with stronger financial constraints are those that find it relatively more difficult to raise funds to finance investment. First, we look at the size of firms, using the number of employees as well as the market value of firms as our size variables.
Second, we follow the example of Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and use several more direct measures of financial constraints: the cash flow to income ratio and the ratio of debt to total capital. The underlying rationale for including these two measures is that a firm can finance investment either by raising funds internally-by using existing cash flows generatedor externally-via bank loans or capital markets. In theory, our priors are that firms with large cash flows should be more immune to changes in interest rates as they can rely more on internal financing of investment. One may expect that firms with a lower ratio of debt to capital are affected more by monetary policy because they are more bank-dependent and bank-dependent borrowers are hit more strongly by a change in the supply of credit Blinder, 1992, Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, 1993) .
Moreover, we include the price-earnings ratio in our analysis. Finally, we employ Moody's investment rating and Moody's bank loan rating as two measures of financial constraints. We would expect that firms with a better rating should find it 4. More precisely, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) test whether various capital and book ratios-the cash flow to capital ratio, Tobin's q (proxied by firms' market to book ratios), and the three ratios of debt, of dividends, and of cash holdings to total capital-are systematically related to their qualitative measure of financial constraints. They do find a significant relationship for most of these variables, though the finding for q is ambiguous, as discussed above in the Introduction. The main focus of the paper by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) is on the link between investment and financial constraints, and does not analyze equity markets.
easier to obtain financing of their investments and therefore should be less affected by changes in monetary policy. Table 3 provides some summary statistics of the various measures of financial constraints after correcting for outliers, to illustrate the pure cross-sectional dispersion of the variables. Table 4 presents the correlations of the various measures of financial constraints and Tobin's q. The key point from this table is that most of the variables have a low degree of correlation. Exceptions are the two size measuresnumber of employees and market size-as well as the correlations of the two size measures with the debt to total capital ratio. Table 5 shows the empirical findings for the various measures of financial constraints. As a general principle underlying the analysis, firms have been divided into three groups according to their position in the cross-sectional distribution of each variable, which has been calculated on a daily basis.
5 The left-hand-side columns use the bottom third of the distribution of each respective variable for a firm to have a low measure, the middle third (i.e. between 33% and 67%) to have a medium level, and the top third to have a high level of the variable. The righthand-side columns of Table 5 make a similar categorization, but using instead the 10% and 90% levels as cut-offs. All results have undergone robustness checks, such as excluding outliers from the estimation. The results proved, however, highly robust to such changes.
First, the results provide evidence that the size of firms is an important factor for the determination of the monetary policy transmission in equity markets. Small firms, based either on the number of employees or the market value of firms, are estimated to react more to monetary policy shocks than medium-sized and large firms. This is very much in line with the finding in the literature, as discussed above, that small firms tend to be more affected by such shocks. Nevertheless, it is interesting that we can confirm this result also for a set of firms that are overall quite large. 5. The fact that the categorization is done on a daily basis is important because it allows controlling for the asymmetries of monetary policy over time. Second, the results show that firms with low cash flows are affected significantly stronger by U.S. monetary policy shocks. For the 10%-90% categorization, stock returns of firms with low cash flows respond almost twice as much to monetary policy (i.e. Ϫ8.8% in response to a 100-bp shock) as compared to firms with high cash flows (i.e. Ϫ4.7% to the same shock).
Third, firms that have a good Moody's investment rating and firms that have a good Moody's bank loan rating 6 are more immune to monetary policy shocks than those with a poor rating. Firms with a poor investment rating or with a low bank loan rating react nearly twice as much to monetary policy (Ϫ6.5% or Ϫ6.1%, respectively) than firms with high ratings (Ϫ3.8% or Ϫ3.9%, respectively).
Fourth, the effects for the debt to capital ratio are found to be non-linear: firms with either high or low values of these ratios respond more to monetary policy than firms that have intermediate levels. Overall, the largest effect of monetary policy is recorded for firms with a low level of debt, whereas firms with high levels of debt react similar to the average firm.
7 This finding is interesting because it may come somewhat unexpected. Indeed, this finding conveys a very interesting message. We interpret it as indicating that firms that have a high level of debt are not more constrained financially than others. On the contrary, the results suggest that firms hold low levels of debt because they are currently financially constrained and thus may find it relatively more difficult to borrow more. A similar result has been found, e.g., in Peersman and Smets (2002) and Dedola and Lippi (2000) .
Fifth, firms with a high price earnings ratio are affected more strongly by monetary policy, indicating that the re-assessment of their earnings expectations is particularly sensitive to changes in interest rates.
Finally, economic theory is ambiguous about the relationship between monetary policy, equity markets and Tobin's q, as a proxy of investment opportunities and an important corollary of the analyzed financial constraint proxies. On the one 6. Of course, both measures are highly correlated as firms with good investment ratings also tend to have good bank loan ratings.
7. This effect is found to be statistically significant also when comparing the effects of low levels versus high levels of debt, the test for which is not shown in Table 5.   TABLE 5 Tobin's q, Financial Constraints, and the The categorization is made according to the following specification: each firm's respective variable is defined to be "low" if it is in the bottom 33% or in the bottom 10% of the variable's distribution, "high"
if it is in the top 33% or 10%, and "medium" otherwise. Categorization for both Moody ratings is "high" if the rating is in the A range, and "low" otherwise.
b
Shows p-value of test of the null hypotheses that the coefficient of low level and high level of financial constraints, respectively, is different from the medium level. The test for Moody's ratings is for equality of coefficients of low rating versus high rating.
The estimated model is an extension of Equation (2):
where x 1 (x 2 ) denotes a dummy variable that defines whether a firm belongs to the low (high) categorization.
hand, a high q indicates that ample investment opportunities are present for a firm, which may imply, ceteris paribus, that this firm has higher financial constraints by requiring more external funds to finance this investment. The higher degree of constraints may therefore also imply a higher sensitivity of this firm to monetary policy shocks. On the other hand, a firm with a relatively high value of its assets (a larger q) may find it easier and may receive more favorable conditions to raise external funds to finance investment. This in turn would imply that firms with a large q have lower financial constraints and hence they may be less sensitive to monetary policy shocks. Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) , we use firms' market to book ratios as proxies for Tobin's q. It is clearly difficult if not impossible to measure q accurately, 8 but using the market to book ratio is fairly common in the literature and should provide a reasonably close approximation. Table 5 reveals that the strongest response of equity returns to monetary policy shocks is experienced by firms with a high q. This difference is sizeable, but significant only for the 33%Ϫ67% categorization.
Overall, the results show that much of the asymmetric response of firms to monetary policy shocks, as shown in Figure 1 , is explained by differences across firms in their degree to which they are financially constrained and to which they have different investment opportunities, as proxied by Tobin's q. 9 3. CONCLUSIONS This paper has analyzed the reaction of equity markets to U.S. monetary policy in the period 1994 to 2003. In particular, this paper has focused on the relative contributions of the credit channel and the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. The empirical methodology employs monetary policy surprises defined as the unexpected component of FOMC announcements on the days of policy decisions. Similar to Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) , this empirical measure avoids the pitfalls of endogeneity and lack of identification, as outlined by Sack (2002, 2003) , by instead developing and employing a truly exogenous measure of monetary policy shocks.
As to the results of this paper, we have found evidence that monetary policy affects individual stocks in a strongly heterogeneous fashion. First, industrial sectors that are cyclical and capital-intensive react frequently two to three times stronger to U.S. monetary policy than non-cyclical industries.
8. See Erickson and Whited (2000) for a detailed analysis of the potential importance of measurement errors in Tobin's q. The focus of the paper by Erickson and Whited is, however, primarily on the relationship between Tobin's q and investment.
9. When accounting for the correlations between industry-affiliation and financial constraints and Tobin's q by using a sample based on propensity score matching, it turns out that the significant heterogeneity of the effects of monetary policy on individual stocks prevails. Financial constraints, Tobin's q, and industry affiliation all play a role, but it is in particular the industry affiliation that is of central importance in explaining the large heterogeneity of firms' reaction to US monetary policy shocks. See Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) for a detailed exposition of this test.
Second, looking at various measures of financial constraints we show that firms that are financially constrained respond significantly more to monetary policy than less constrained ones. A somewhat unexpected finding is that the largest effect of monetary policy is experienced by firms with a low level of debt, whereas firms with high levels of debt react similar to the average firm. We interpret this result as indicating that firms that have a high level of debt are not more constrained financially than others, but instead that firms hold low levels of debt because they are currently financially constrained and thus may not be able to borrow more. Furthermore, we find that firms with a high Tobin's q are affected more.
Overall, the results show that much of the asymmetric response of individual firms to monetary policy is explained by the different degrees of financial constraints and investment opportunities across firms. APPENDIX A A k,t ϭ α ϩ βE k,t ϩ ε k,t .
The unbiasedness test is a Wald test of the joint hypothesis H 0 : α ϭ 0 and β ϭ 1. This hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 90% level. 
with the lag length usually chosen as P ϭ 6. The hypothesis to be tested is ψ 1 ϭ ψ 2 ϭ ... ϭ ψ P ϭ 0. The Wald tests show that this hypothesis cannot be rejected for the expectation series.
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